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Abstract 
 
The article examines whether commodity risk is priced in the cross-section of global equity 
returns. We employ a long-only equally-weighted portfolio of commodity futures and a term 
structure portfolio that captures phases of backwardation and contango as mimicking portfolios 
for commodity risk. We find that equity-sorted portfolios with greater sensitivities to the excess 
returns of the backwardation and contango portfolio command higher average excess returns, 
suggesting that when measured appropriately, commodity risk is pervasive in stocks. Our 
conclusions are robust to the addition to the pricing model of financial, macroeconomic and 
business cycle-based risk factors.  
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1. Introduction 
Following a bear market that lasted two decades during the 1980s and 1990s, commodity prices 
rose phenomenally in the early years of the new millennium. For instance, the value of crude oil 
increased five-fold between the start of 2002 and mid-2008 while the price of gold also 
quintupled between 2000 and 2011, although the prices of both have slumped again more 
recently. The prices of other commodities, including energy, some foodstuffs, metals and other 
minerals, rose in tandem. Not only did prices rise substantially, the volatility of price changes 
was argued to have increased too (see Orberndorfer, 2009).  
To what extent have these enormous changes in the state of the commodity markets affected 
stocks? The relationship between the prices of commodities and of equities is a complex, multi-
faceted one. Leaving aside that they represent substitute investments,1 at the same time, 
commodity and stock prices are linked, both directly and indirectly, as a result of the important 
use of commodities in production processes. The direct effect occurs when changes in the costs 
of commodities affect a firm’s profitability.2 The indirect impact of commodity price rises takes 
place through their effects on the inflation rate via the costs of goods, and the resulting fall in 
consumers’ purchasing powers will then adversely affect their demand for end products and 
services. Eventually, this will feed through to firms’ cashflows (see Jones and Kaul, 1996).3 
Thus, through their impacts on the real economy via effects on firms’ cost bases and consumers’ 
purchasing powers, commodity price shocks should have pervasive effects on the prices of the 
                                                 
1 Albeit constituting a small proportion of typical investor portfolios. See, for example, Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
(2006) and Erb and Harvey (2006) for a discussion of commodities from the investment perspective as an asset class.  
2 Companies in some industries (e.g., refined food producers, airlines, and paint manufacturers) are very heavy users 
where commodities are a significant proportion of their overall costs. Such firms, in the absence of any insurance or 
hedging, will be hit hard when commodity prices spike upwards. By contrast, companies in the commodity 
production industries (e.g. miners, oil companies, farmers) will benefit from such rises. Another group comprising 
almost all other firms (which we might term light physical resource users) will face modest commodity price 
exposure since their production involves transportation, heating, construction and so on. 
3 Hou and Szymanowska (2013) argue that commodity futures prices and consumption are highly correlated since 
around 40% of personal expenditure is effectively on commodities, roughly half of which is on energy and food. 
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vast majority of stocks and not just on those of heavy users such as airlines or those of producers 
such as oil and gas extractors. We therefore believe that changes in commodity prices should 
constitute priced risk factors in the sense of the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross (1976), first 
empirically tested in Chen, Roll and Ross (1986).4  
Given this important link between commodity and stock prices, it is perhaps expectable that 
the latter will command a positive premium for exposure to changes in the former. A recent 
strand of the asset pricing literature argues that commodity risk has a role to play in pricing 
traditional assets. For example, Boons, de Roon, and Szymanowska (2014) find that stocks with 
high-commodity betas underperform by 8% a year pre-2003 and outperform by 11% post-2003,5 
while Hou and Szymanowska (2013) show that a commodity-based consumption tracking 
portfolio explains the cross-section of average stock returns.6  
This article tests whether two commodity portfolios – a long-only equally-weighted portfolio 
of commodity futures (AVG hereafter), and a term structure portfolio (TS hereafter) that is long 
backwardated commodities and short contangoed commodities – explain the pricing of the 25 
size and book-to-market (SBM) sorted global equity portfolios of Fama and French (1998). A key 
characteristic of this paper is that it attempts to capture directly, through the use of varying time 
frames for commodity yields, the impact of backwardation and contango on the premia that 
                                                 
4 Commodity variables have also been shown to act as leading economic indicators. For example, Hamilton (1983), 
Jones and Kaul (1996) and Driesprong, Jacobsen and Maat (2008) argue that oil price rises contribute to economic 
recessions and to falling stock prices. Jacobsen, Marshall and Visaltanachoti (2013) demonstrate that industrial metal 
price movements forecast economic growth, with Hu and Xiong (2013) also ascribing such a barometric role to 
copper and soybean prices and Bakshi, Panayotov and Skoulakis (2014) to a measure of shipping freight activity (the 
Baltic Dry Index). Commodity open interest and phases of backwardation and contango in commodity futures 
markets have also been shown to matter as indicators of forthcoming changes in investment opportunities (Hong and 
Yogo, 2012; Bakshi, Gao and Rossi, 2015; Miffre et al., 2015). 
5 They attribute the reversals in signs to the financialization of commodity futures markets that lowered participation 
costs and thus enabled investors to hedge commodity risk directly using futures post-2003 as opposed to indirectly 
using stocks beforehand. 
6 Along the same lines, Miffre, Fuertes and Fernandez-Perez (2015) document that commodity risk factors relating to 
backwardation and contango act as sources of inter-temporal risk in equity markets. 
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investors demand in equity markets.7 The rationale for treating the commodity-based TS portfolio 
as a risk factor that is potentially priced follows from the theory of storage of Kaldor (1939), 
Working (1949) and Brennan (1958). The theory of storage argues that backwardation (as 
evidenced by a downward-sloping TS of commodity futures prices) signals scarce supply and 
forthcoming price rises, while contango (supported by an upward-sloping TS) translates into 
abundant supply and upcoming price falls (see also Fama and French, 1987; Erb and Harvey, 
2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 2013).  
Assuming that the number of firms consuming commodities exceeds the number producing 
them, phases of backwardation could be considered as bad news to equity investors as rising 
commodity prices would then translate into potentially falling net profit margins. Vice versa, 
phases of contango could be considered as good news to equity investors as falling commodity 
prices could translate into potentially rising net profit margins. Other things being equal, equity 
investors would be expected to demand greater expected returns on stocks that are more sensitive 
to backwardation, lower expected returns on stocks that are more sensitive to contango and thus 
the TS portfolio that is long backwardated commodities and short contangoed commodities would 
then command a positive risk premium in the cross-section of stock returns.8 The question of the 
sign and statistical significance of the AVG, and TS risk premia in the cross-section of equity 
returns thus needs to be empirically tested, which is the primary objective of this paper. 
We present evidence in support of the hypotheses that AVG is not priced and that the TS 
portfolio commands a positive and significant price of risk in global equity markets. This 
                                                 
7 In a production economy commodity prices have differentiated effects through the cross section of asset returns and 
the degree of premia required by a well-diversified investor for commodity risk allows a policy maker to understand 
the impact, cross-sectionally, on firms from shocks to prices. 
8 Alternatively, rising commodity prices could signal improved economic prospects (Hu and Xiong, 2013; Jacobsen 
et al., 2013) and thus potentially higher firm profits. Under this alternate setting, the AVG and TS commodity 
portfolios would be priced negatively. We could therefore argue that the impact of commodity price changes will be 
dependent upon whether they are the cause (due to a commodity supply shock) or effect (due to changes in 
commodity demand) of changes in economic activity.   
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highlights the importance of both backwardation and contango phases as important in 
constructing a risk factor. Other things being equal, equity investors are willing to pay less for 
stocks that are more exposed to commodity risks. Our conclusions are not an artifact driven by 
crude oil, nor are they due to a specific formulation of the asset pricing model (Fama and French, 
1993; Chen et al., 1986) and nor to the inclusion of a composite leading indicator in the asset 
pricing model. In a further robustness analysis, we find this positive relationship between 
commodity risks and equity returns is stronger in recent years. These results are in line with those 
of Boons et al. (2014) showing that the effect of the hedging of commodity risk with commodity 
futures is also a phenomenon present in international equity portfolios. 
Since commodities have important uses in numerous production processes, it is intuitive to 
think that commodity risk could affect the pricing of stocks, which is the focus of our paper. 
However, two important questions to ask at the outset are first, whether investors can diversify 
away commodity price risk, and second, whether firms themselves are able to hedge this risk. If 
the answer to either or both of these questions is affirmative, we would not expect commodity 
risk to be priced. Concerning the issue relating to diversification, there is convincing evidence 
that commodity variables predict the business cycle (Hamilton, 1983; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Hu 
and Xiong, 2013; Bakshi et al., 2014; Miffre et al., 2015), suggesting that commodity risk affects 
economic output and consumer demand and therefore firms’ profits. Thus commodity risk is 
expected to be pervasive and could be priced cross-sectionally. 
When it comes to the question pertaining to hedging, the positions of energy producers, 
refiners and consumers highlight selective hedging and some speculation (Dewally, Ederington 
and Fernando, 2013). Even among oil and gas producers, who have clear, identifiable and 
significant commodity price exposures, around a third of a sample of 330 firms was found not to 
hedge exposures to changes in either oil or gas prices (Jin and Jorion, 2006). Considering more 
6 
 
widely the universe of firms which we capture in our stock portfolios, there are many reasons to 
believe that commodity producers, processors and consumers cannot hedge price risk fully. 
Complete hedging would be too expensive in terms of both transaction costs and losses incurred 
from not benefiting from anticipated price changes. Besides, it may be seen as simply impossible 
for a producer to fully hedge the indirect effects that commodity price shocks have on the real 
economy and thereby on consumers’ demand for the products and services that this specific firm 
offers.9 For example, a widely cited 1998 survey demonstrated that a surprisingly small 
percentage of firms engage in any hedging activities (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1998).10 More 
recently, a survey reported in El-Masry (2006) suggests that a third of their sample of UK non-
financial companies do not hedge at all. The non-hedging issue is particularly pressing for small 
firms as only 10% engage in hedging according to El-Masry (2006, Figure 3). More specifically, 
only around 20% of UK FTSE350 firms hedged using commodity derivatives in 2010 
(Panaretou, 2014, Table 1) Consumers are also affected by commodity price changes, in 
particular due to their expenditure on fuel and food. Thus if hedging is – as it seems – 
incomplete, investors in the cross-section should demand, as we hypothesize, a premium for 
holding commodity risk.  
Given the obvious importance of the relationship between commodity prices and economic 
activity (see, for example, Driesprong et al., 2008), it is perhaps surprising to see that only a few 
studies tested for a commodity risk premium in stock returns with the majority of existing 
research examining the link at the aggregate equity market level and focusing exclusively on 
                                                 
9 Producers’ hedging demand has been shown to relate to distress and default risks, with safer producers presenting a 
lower propensity to hedge (Haushalter, 2000; Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai, 2013). 
10 The most commonly cited reason in Bodnar et al. (1998) for not hedging was that the direct exposures were 
considered insufficient to make it worthwhile.  
7 
 
oil.11 The closest study to our own is that of Boons et al. (2014), which estimates the 
compensation that investors demand when holding stocks with high commodity betas – we 
explain below how our research differs from theirs.  
We contribute to this literature in several important ways. First, existing studies have 
essentially employed commodity futures price indices as the basis for measuring risk but they do 
not capture the market’s expectation of whether commodity prices are likely to rise or fall in the 
future compared with current prices. By using a measure of the extent to which the commodity 
markets are on aggregate backwardated or contangoed, by contrast our measure of commodity 
price risk has a dimension that reflects both current underlying demand and supply conditions 
and investor beliefs about how they will change in those markets. Our study is the first to propose 
such a measure as a factor to explain the cross-sectional variation in asset returns. Second, since 
the factor is based on the returns to portfolios of commodities, while the dependent variables are 
the returns to portfolios of stocks, our study is not beset by the ‘near tautology problem’ that may 
arise in existing research where the dependent variables are portfolios of stocks sorted on 
commodity price risks. Third, our research differs from existing work in terms of the test assets 
used, which in our case are global size and book-to-market portfolios. We would argue that in the 
context of commodities, which are used around the world and traded on global markets, the 
relevant set of test assets would involve stocks from the entire global universe rather than being 
drawn from a single country. Fourth, we employ a two-step time-series of cross-sections 
approach which also provides a contrast with the generalized method of moments, not used here 
but present in several existing studies; further details on the two approaches are given in the 
methodology section below.  
                                                 
11 On the cross-sectional side, early research by Chen et al. (1986) suggested that changes in oil prices were not 
significantly priced in the cross-section of returns on size-sorted portfolios, although it is possible that any oil price 
effects were subsumed by inflation, which was also included in their specification. 
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2. Methodology 
There are broadly two approaches that have commonly been employed in the empirical asset 
pricing literature: the Fama-MacBeth two-step procedure based on a time-series of cross-sections 
and a single-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of a stochastic discount 
factor, which is an extension of Hansen (1982) – see also Cochrane (1996; 2001; 2005). The one-
step GMM technique is arguably now more prevalent, in part due to its improved efficiency.12 
However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the appropriate estimation 
approach, and by contrast with several other existing studies but in common with Boons et al. 
(2014), we employ a variant of the standard two-step Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology 
rather than GMM. In the first step, we run regressions of the excess returns of size and book-to-
market (B/M) ratio-sorted global equity portfolios on a set of risk premia or a set of unexpected 
risk factors 
𝑅𝑃,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑃,𝑡    (1) 
where 𝑅𝑃,𝑡 are the time t excess returns of size- and book-to-market (B/M) sorted portfolios of 
Fama and French (1998), 𝑃 𝜖 {1,2, … ,25} as described above, 𝐹𝑡 is a vector of 𝐾 risk premia or a 
set of 𝐾 unexpected risk factors that are known, or assumed, to explain the cross-section of global 
equity returns, 𝛽𝑃 is a vector of sensitivities of portfolio 𝑃 to these 𝐾 risk premia or risk factors, 
𝛼𝑃 is a constant and 𝜀𝑃,𝑡 is an error term.  
We use a rolling estimation approach with a five-year window, updated annually. Regression 
(1) is first estimated over the sample January 1991 to December 1995. The measures of risk (𝛽𝑃,𝑡) 
                                                 
12 However, the superiority of GMM is by no means universally accepted – it is intuitively and computationally more 
complex, and more importantly there is suggestion that in some circumstances it will be inferior.  In particular, there 
are issues when the factors are not IID normal and both the betas as well as the risk premia are time-varying 
(Cochrane, 2001). 
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are used in a second step to explain the cross-section of mean excess returns in each month 𝑘 from 
January 1996 to December 1996. The cross-sectional regression in a given month 𝑡 + 𝑘 is:  
𝑅𝑃,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝜆0,𝑡+𝑘 + 𝜆𝑡+𝑘𝛽𝑃,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑃,𝑡+𝑘    (2) 
where 𝜆 is a 𝐾-vector of prices of risk associated with 𝐹𝑡, 𝜆0 is an intercept and 𝜗𝑃 is an error 
term.13 This step produces 12 estimates of the vector {𝜆0, 𝜆}. Finally, the sample is rolled-over by 
12 observations at a time, with each repetition of the two steps producing 12 new estimates of 
each of the factor risk premia.  
While testing significance, we employ the adjustment of Shanken (1992) to the second-stage 
standard errors which takes into account the estimation error in the betas from the first stage. To 
further enhance the robustness of the results to non-normality and other issues, we also 
implement a bootstrap procedure in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure which is a 
variant of that proposed by Kosowski, Timmerman, Wermers, and White (2006) and Bakshi et al. 
(2015). The bootstrap is conducted as described in an appendix.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Base assets 
As outlined above, our base assets are the 25 size- and B/M-sorted global portfolios whose 
returns in excess of the one-month US Treasury-bill rate from January 1991 to December 2012 
are obtained from K. French’s website. The global portfolios include all 23 countries in the four 
regions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
                                                 
13 Note that we follow the standard approach of the two-step estimation procedure as in the existing literature. In 
essence this is an in-sample model fitting exercise rather than out-of-sample forecasting experiment which would 
have required the computation of  both the betas and the lambdas at time t, which would then be rolled onto the 
excess returns at t+k. Instead we are estimating both the beta and the lambda coefficients on the same set of data.  
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Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This is one of the key 
differences between our article and Boons et al. (2014) which studies the performance of equity 
portfolios sorted on commodity betas. We argue that commodity risk is expected to be priced in 
the cross-section of stock returns because it is a pervasive risk that will affect the vast majority of 
firms to some extent. That is, commodity price risk will affect not only the returns of commodity-
related companies (including heavy users such as airlines and producers such as oil extractors) 
but those of all companies. Details on the independent variables that enter equation (1) follow.  
 
3.2. Commodity risk premia 
As the sample of global equity portfolios begins in January 1991, our dataset for commodities 
runs from that date up to December 2012. End-of-month settlement prices are obtained from 
Thomson Datastream on 27 commodities. These include 12 agricultural commodities (cocoa, 
coffee C, corn, cotton n°2, frozen concentrated orange juice, oats, rough rice, soybean meal, 
soybean oil, soybeans, sugar n° 11, wheat), five energy commodities (blend stock RBOB 
gasoline, electricity, heating oil n° 2, WTI light sweet crude oil, natural gas), four livestock 
commodities (feeder cattle, frozen pork bellies, lean hogs, live cattle), five metal commodities 
(copper, gold, palladium, platinum, silver) and random length lumber. As is standard in the 
literature, futures returns are calculated using the settlement prices of front contracts up to one 
month prior to maturity and the settlement prices of second nearest contracts in months when 
front contracts mature.  
We calculate the roll-yields of each commodity as the price differentials between the front 
and second nearest contracts at the end of each month. These roll-yields are argued to contain 
information regarding the market’s expectation of the subsequent direction of spot price changes: 
positive roll-yields imply backwardation, scarce inventories and anticipated rises in futures 
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prices, while negative roll-yields indicate contango, abundant inventories and subsequent falls in 
futures prices. The slope of the term structure of commodity futures prices thus provides 
information about the supply of and demand for the physical asset (as predicted by the theory of 
storage of Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1949; and empirically validated in e.g., Fama and French, 
1987; Gorton et al., 2013). 
The 27 commodities are ordered according to their monthly roll-yields averaged over the 
previous R months (𝑅 = 1, 3, 6, 12).14 We consider relatively long ranking periods of up to 12 
months to account for the fact that inventory levels are slow to replenish or deplete; the relatively 
long moving average employed is thus deemed appropriate to capture the slow changes in the 
slope of the term structure over time in reference to the theory of storage – see, for example, 
Gorton et al. (2013). Other existing studies also take an average, such as Basu and Miffre (2013). 
We then buy the front contracts of the 25% of the cross-section of commodities with the highest 
average roll-yields and sell the front contracts of the 25% of the cross-section of commodities 
with the lowest average roll-yields. We also form a fully-collateralized TS portfolio that includes 
both long positions in the 25% most backwardated commodities and short positions in the 25% 
most contangoed commodities. The positions are held for one month, the sample is shifted by one 
month and a new set of backwardated, contangoed and TS portfolios is formed. We use the 
excess returns of these three portfolios as separate sources of commodity price risk. 
A benefit of using portfolios made of commodities with extreme roll-yields is that our 
portfolios will hone in on the commodities with the greatest expected future price changes. These 
portfolios will also capture the extent of systematic hedging pressure (Cootner, 1960; Hirshleifer, 
1988; Bessembinder, 1992; Basu and Miffre, 2013) since commodities that are in backwardation 
                                                 
14 Thus R = 1 refers to the roll yield at the end of the most recent month (as in  Daskalaki et al., 2014; Szymanowska 
et al., 2014; or Bakshi et al., 2015).  
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(respectively, contango) according to their inventory or roll-yields typically tend to also be in 
backwardation (contango) with respect to their hedging pressures (Dewally, Ederington and 
Fernando, 2013). In order to test this possibility directly, we also build a HP-mimicking portfolio 
à-la Basu and Miffre (2013). The HP signal for the ith commodity combines the hedging 
pressure of hedgers (𝐻𝑃𝐻,𝑖) and of speculators (𝐻𝑃𝑆,𝑖) defined as 𝐻𝑃𝐻,𝑖 ≡
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐻,𝑖
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐻,𝑖+𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐻,𝑖
 and 
𝐻𝑃𝑆,𝑖 ≡
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑆,𝑖
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑆,𝑖+𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑆,𝑖
, where 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐻,𝑖 denotes the open interest of long hedgers, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐻,𝑖 
denotes the open interest of short hedgers, and so forth. As before for roll-yields, the HP signals 
are averaged over various ranking periods ranging from 1 to 12 months. The HP portfolio then 
buys the 25% of backwardated contracts with the lowest average 𝐻𝑃𝐻,𝑖 value and the highest 
average 𝐻𝑃𝑆,𝑖 value; shorts the 25% contangoed contracts with the highest average 𝐻𝑃𝐻,𝑖 and 
lowest average 𝐻𝑃𝑆,𝑖 values (HP hereafter) and holds the long-short positions for one month.
15 
Then the sample is shifted by one month and a new set of backwardated, contangoed and HP 
portfolios is formed. Finally, in order to proxy for commodity market prices more generally, we 
also employ a long-only monthly-rebalanced equally-weighted portfolio of all commodities (AVG 
hereafter). 
Table I, Panel A presents summary statistics for the excess returns of the fully-collateralized 
backwardated, contangoed and long-short portfolios based on TS signals over the period January 
1991 to December 2012. Table I, Panel B reports similar information for the backwardated, 
contangoed and long-short portfolios based on hedging pressure signals. Clearly the TS and HP 
strategies work well in the sense that forming portfolios in this fashion generates positive mean 
excess returns, as Erb and Harvey (2006), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Basu and Miffre 
                                                 
15 According to the hedging pressure hypothesis of Cootner (1960) and Hirshleifer (1988), as validated in 
Bessembinder (1992) or Basu and Miffre (2013) amongst others, backwardation (contango) occurs when hedgers are 
net short (long) and speculators are net long (short).  
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(2013), amongst others, previously documented. The long-short fully-collateralized TS portfolios 
generate average excess returns that range between 3.84% and 8.61% a year, with significant 
Sharpe ratios between 0.40 and 0.99. A monthly-rebalanced equally-weighted portfolio of the 
four long-short TS portfolios, labeled 𝐸𝑊(𝑅 = 1, 3, 6, 12), earns a mean excess return of 5.95% 
a year, significant at the 1% level and a Sharpe ratio of 0.73, which is also significant at the 1% 
level. Likewise, the long-short fully-collateralized HP portfolios generate average excess returns 
between 2.48% and 6.95% a year, with Sharpe ratios between 0.31 and 0.84, most of them being 
significant. This performance compares well to that of AVG, the long-only commodity portfolio, 
which stands at -2.47% a year (t-statistic of -1.11). This highlights the importance of taking a 
long-short approach to commodity investing. The AVG, TS and HP portfolios have been shown to 
explain the cross-section of commodity futures returns (Basu and Miffre, 2013; Szymanowska, 
de Roon, Nijman and Van Den Goorbergh, 2014; Bakshi et al., 2015). The key question of our 
article is whether they are similarly able to explain the cross-section of global equity returns. 
< Insert Table I around here > 
 
3.3. Traditional risk factors 
Aside from these commodity portfolios, we employ two separate sets of variables for inclusion in 
the matrix 𝐹 in equation (1). The first set includes the global equivalent of the Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) risk premia: the global equity risk premium, ERM; the global size 
premium, SMB (small-minus-big); the global value premium, HML (high B/M-minus-low B/M) 
and the global momentum premium (UMD, up-minus-down). The value-weighted return of all 
stocks included in the 23 countries mentioned above, in excess of the one-month US Treasury bill 
rate, is used as a proxy for the global market risk premium. Data on global ERM, SMB, HML and 
UMD are obtained from K. French’s website. 
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Upward commodity price shocks are drivers of upward movements in the costs of production 
and therefore general price levels; consequently, the periods of historically very high commodity 
prices (during the 1970s in particular) were associated with high inflation and reduced economic 
activity. It is thus plausible that the commodity price effects assumed to be present in the cross-
section of equity portfolios are merely an indirect way to capture premia relating to 
macroeconomic risks. In an attempt to test this empirically, we employ factors that capture 
unexpected changes in the macroeconomic environment as a second set of independent variables. 
Following Chen et al. (1986), these include: the monthly growth in industrial production (IP), the 
changes in expected inflation (DEI), unexpected inflation (UI), shocks to default (UDS) and term 
(UTS) spreads,16alongside with shocks to a composite leading indicator index (UCLI) obtained 
from the OECD website. On the grounds that commodity prices are affected by global supply and 
demand factors, we opt for the World UCLI figures – this is discussed in more detail in Section 
5.4 below. 
Table II, Panel A (Table II, Panel B) presents the correlations between the traditional risk 
premia on the one hand and the AVG, backwardated, contangoed and long-short portfolios based 
on TS signals (HP signals) on the other hand. The correlations between the AVG, backwardated, 
contangoed and long-short portfolios and the traditional return-based risk factors are low, ranging 
from -0.17 to 0.46. Yet, some of the correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
                                                 
16 The IP series is computed by taking the log differences of US industrial production. To derive the DEI series, we 
first calculate the inflation rate by taking log changes in the consumer price index. Then, we calculate expected 
inflation to be the 3-month moving average of the inflation rate series. UI is estimated by deducting the expected 
inflation rate from the observed inflation rate. The difference between Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield 
and long-term government bond yields (10-years) gives the UDS series whilst the UTS measure is the difference 
between long-term government bond yields (10-year) and the yield on 3-month Treasury bills. All the financial and 
macroeconomic series used in the aforementioned calculations are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Data website. Given the importance of the US economy in global wealth, we believe these US financial and 
macroeconomic variables are suitable proxies for their global counterparts. 
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suggesting that phases of backwardation and contango or the general level of commodity prices 
might proxy for risk in a manner akin to ERM, SMB, HML or UMD.  
< Insert Table II around here >  
As expected, the correlations are positive and highly significant between the excess returns 
on the equally-weighted portfolio of all commodities (AVG) and the excess returns of the 
backwardated portfolios, with coefficients around 0.8. The same conclusion applies to the return 
correlations between AVG and the contangoed portfolios. Given that both the TS and HP signals 
are deemed to capture phases of backwardation and contango, it is not surprising to see that the 
return correlations between the backwardated (contangoed and long-short) portfolios based on the 
TS and HP signals are high, around 0.65. Therefore, in the following regressions we analyze the 
effect of the TS signals after accounting for AVG and HP by systematically considering as 
independent variables the residuals from regressions of the excess returns of the backwardated 
(contangoed and long-short, respectively) TS portfolios onto a constant, the excess returns of the 
AVG portfolio, and the excess returns of the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, 
respectively) HP portfolios. Likewise, we model the residual impact of HP after accounting for 
AVG and TS. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table III presents the average values (and associated t-statistics) for the risk premia obtained 
when the global risk premia of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) enter equation (1) 
alongside the AVG and the orthogonalized backwardated (contangoed or long-short) TS and HP 
portfolios. The first row of Panel A shows the prices of risk associated with only the market, size, 
value and momentum risk premia, excluding any commodity risk measures at all; in the second 
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row the equally-weighted commodity portfolio AVG is also added to regressions (1) and (2). The 
results in the first row show that the risks associated with the market and value portfolios are 
priced according to Shanken’s t-statistics (reported in parentheses) but not according to the 
bootstrap p-values (reported in brackets). The result remains unchanged when the AVG excess 
returns are treated as an additional independent variable. AVG is not priced either.  
< Insert Table III around here > 
The remainder of Table III presents similar results when the pricing model includes not only 
AVG and the traditional risk premia, but also the TS and HP risk premia. Panel B (C and D, 
respectively) treats as additional risk premia the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, 
respectively) TS and HP portfolios in regressions (1) and (2). The estimated 𝑇𝑆  coefficients 
shown in Panel B of Table III are positive and mostly statistically significant, indicative that 
backwardation represents bad news to equity investors; equities with high sensitivity to 
backwardation are priced down, with investors demanding yearly mean returns that are, all else 
equal, 18.1% higher on these stocks. Therefore, this relationship is economically as well as 
statistically significant. By contrast, the results in Panel C show that, as we anticipated, contango 
represents good news to equity investors: Other things being equal, equities with high sensitivity 
to contango are more highly priced with investors demanding yearly expected returns that are 
4.31% lower on these stocks. Nevertheless, this relationship is statistically insignificant. The 
long-short TS portfolios (i.e. when both backwardation and contango are considered together in 
forming the portfolios) in Panel D command a positive annualized risk premium of 13.5% that is 
statistically significant at the 12.55% level or better for the longer term portfolios and for the 
long-short portfolio that equally-weights all four ranking periods. The pricing of the TS signal 
goes well beyond the role played by average commodity price levels (AVG). The latter is found to 
command a negative risk premium that is statistically insignificant. Moreover, as stated above, 
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these TS portfolios are able to capture the extent of systematic hedging pressure, and therefore the 
long-short HP portfolios are not priced and have no consistent signs in any of panels B to D. 
Overall, the results of Table III clearly suggest that commodity risks are priced in global 
equity markets: investors demand more for stocks that are sensitive to the risk that commodity 
prices may change. The results pertaining to the backwardated, contangoed and long-short 
portfolios based on TS also suggest that the slope of the term structure of commodity futures 
prices has a role to play beyond that embodied in both the AVG and HP commodity portfolios. 
The 𝐴𝑉𝐺  coefficients are less significant than the 𝑇𝑆 coefficients, despite the excess returns of 
the backwardated, contangoed and long-short TS portfolios having all been orthogonalized with 
respect to the AVG excess returns.17 All in all, it appears that global equity markets price the 
commodity-based TS portfolios separately to the traditional market, size, value and momentum 
risk premia. It is also worth noting that we use returns on portfolios of commodities rather than 
stock-based portfolio returns as explanatory variables, which may explain why our conclusions 
differ from those of Boons et al.  (2014).  
To get a better understanding of the fit of the various models, Figure 1 plots actual and fitted 
mean excess returns for the 25 global SBM portfolios, where the fitted values are obtained either 
from the traditional model of Carhart (1997) (Table III, Panel A, row: ‘Without AVG, TS and 
HP’) or from an augmented version thereof that includes AVG, as well as the equally-weighted 
long-short TS and HP portfolios (Table III, Panel D, row: 𝐸𝑊 (𝑅 = 1,3,6,12)). It is entirely 
evident that the model fit improves when the commodity risk premia are included (triangles) 
                                                 
17 Similar unreported results were obtained when the excess returns of the backwardated (contangoed and long-short) 
TS portfolios were forced to be orthogonalized to the excess returns of the AVG portfolio, to the excess returns of the 
backwardated (contangoed and long-short) HP portfolios and to global versions of the Carhart (1997) traditional risk 
premia. 
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relative to the case when they are excluded (squares); the former are indeed closer to the 45 
degree line than the latter. 
<Insert Figure 1 around here> 
Table IV presents the full-sample beta estimates of the 25 global SBM portfolios relative 
to the excess returns of the AVG and long-short TS portfolios; the TS portfolio used in this regard 
is that of Table III, Panel D, row: 𝐸𝑊 (𝑅 = 1,3,6,12).18 High book-to-market and small stocks 
tend to have higher exposures to both commodity risk premia; however, these results may mask 
variations in betas over time which we allow for in our empirical procedure. The time-varying 
betas of the 25 global SBM portfolios and their t-ratios relative to the TS risk premium are 
presented in Figures 2 and 3 respectively; the variations are captured by rolling the regressions 
(1) and (2) forward using the procedure described in Section 2. We can see that both the betas 
and their t-ratios are stable over time for given portfolios and that the t-ratios present a slight 
tendency to increase over time.  
< Insert Table IV and Figures 2 and 3 around here > 
 
5. Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis 
5.1. Sub-Sample Analysis 
We repeat the analysis reported in Panels B to D of Table III over two consecutive sub-samples 
spanning January 1991 – December 1999 and January 2000 – December 2012, respectively.19 
The choice of sub-samples is somewhat arbitrary but splits the overall data period available 
roughly in half. The risk premia associated with the backwardated and long-short TS portfolios 
for the sub-samples are mostly positive although the results for the early sub-sample are weaker 
                                                 
18 In order to preserve space, we do not present these estimates for all the regressors. 
19 In the interests of brevity and to avoid a proliferation of large tables, we do not present the results.  
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than for the whole sample. Likewise, the prices of risk associated with the contangoed portfolios 
are negative. For the most part, the magnitudes of the prices of commodity risk are similar to 
those reported in Table III. This indicates that investors persistently require rewards for holding 
stocks exposed to commodity risks. We note, however, a considerable reduction in the statistical 
significance of all prices of risk in the first sub-sample. We conjecture that this fall in statistical 
significance is at least in part a function of the fall in sample size from the regressions using the 
whole sample. This has obvious implications for the magnitudes of the standard errors that are 
inversely related to number of data points, all else equal.  
Boons et al. (2014) argue that financialization led to lower participation costs and a reversal 
in signs of the premium earned on high-minus-low commodity beta stocks (from negative at -8% 
pre-2004 to positive at 11% post-2004). Their results are not directly comparable to ours because 
of differences in methodologies, base assets and commodity risks.20 However, this 
notwithstanding, we also find much stronger evidence of a significant commodity risk premium 
in the second part of the sample.  
 
5.2. Are the Commodity Risk Premia an Oil Risk Premium? 
Crude oil makes up the majority of most weighted commodity index baskets. Increases in crude 
oil prices are also likely to have a more perilous impact on economic output, consumer price 
levels and firms’ profits than comparable rises in the prices of other less traded commodities such 
as frozen pork bellies. Hamilton (2009) provides a demonstration of the importance of oil for the 
economy through its effect on consumer purchasing power, arguing that oil price increases in 
                                                 
20 Our methodology differs from that of Boons et al. (2014) inasmuch as we use Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step 
approach to explain the pricing of size- and value-sorted global equity portfolios, when Boons et al. measure the 
difference in performance of equity portfolios sorted on commodity betas. Another key difference relates to the 
portfolios employed to proxy for commodity risks: we use AVG and TS when Boons et al. consider only one 
commodity portfolio which is similar in spirit to AVG. 
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2007-8 were a primary contributor to the ensuing recession even though the cause (increasing 
demand especially from China against a backdrop of flat supply) was fundamentally different to 
that of previous oil price spikes (which were primarily the result of significant supply 
interruptions). As a result, it is reasonable to question whether the observed premium which 
investors require for holding equities susceptible to commodity price changes is actually a noisy 
way to proxy for the impact of crude oil rather than that of a broader class of commodities.21 In 
order to test this, we replicate the analysis reported in Table III but we now orthogonalize the 
excess returns of our commodity portfolios22 to the excess return of crude oil so that the former 
are linearly purged of any influence coming from the latter. The results, reported in Table V, 
indicate that our main conclusions regarding the signs and statistical significances of the prices of 
TS risk are fully robust to the exclusion of crude oil. We conclude therefore that the results 
reported thus far are not an artifact of crude oil.  
< Insert Table V around here > 
 
5.3. Financial and Macroeconomic Risk Factors 
As discussed in Section 3, it may be that commodity price changes are merely capturing 
information that could be modeled more directly using macroeconomic variables, including most 
notably exposures to unexpected inflation. In order to test this, Table VI presents the averages of 
the prices of risk estimated from second-stage cross-sectional regressions that employ shocks to a 
set of financial and macroeconomic variables as risk factors. It is clear from the parameter 
estimates and their t-statistics that the key messages from the above analysis remain. The 
                                                 
21 Chen et al. (1986) originally test for, and find evidence against, an oil term being significant in pricing the cross-
section of equity returns. They surmise that the effect of oil price rises could be picked up more cleanly by other 
variables such as national output.  
22 The orthogonalization is applied to AVG, to the backwardated, contangoed, and long-short portfolios based on the 
TS and HP signals. 
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estimated TS risk premia are of similar magnitude as in Table III, with unchanged levels of 
statistical significance for the long and long-short portfolios; the contangoed portfolios now 
attract negative and often statistically significant risk premia. Therefore, we conclude that the 
proposed commodity risks command premia in the cross-section of equity returns that are distinct 
from, and more important than, those obtained from exposure to inflationary or financial factors. 
Interestingly, among the financial and macroeconomic factors themselves, only changes in 
expected inflation are positively and significantly (at the 5% level) priced in the cross-section of 
the 25 global SBM portfolios; none of the other financial and macroeconomic risk premia is 
significant even at the 10% level. These conclusions hold irrespective of the statistic considered 
(Shanken’s t-statistic or bootstrap p-value). 
< Insert Table VI around here > 
 
5.4. Are AVG and TS Proxies for Future Economic Activity? 
The motivation for a link between equity and commodity returns presented above presumes that 
rises in commodity prices are unambiguously negative due to the adverse impact that they will 
have on firm profitability and general economic inflation, with consequent reductions in 
consumer purchasing power.23 However, it has also been argued that commodity price rises may 
be a positive signal of increasing economic activity in the future.24 It is also possible that the 
                                                 
23 This is the case of rises in crude oil prices that are deemed to contribute to a reduction of economic growth and 
falling stock prices (Hamilton, 1983, 2009; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Driesprong et al., 2008). 
24 Hu and Xiong (2013) argue that the positive correlation between commodity futures overnight returns and next 
day East Asian stock price changes is indicative of the information-content of the former concerning world economic 
activity. Similarly, Bakshi, Panayotov and Skoulakis (2014) suggest that increases in the Baltic Dry Index might 
occur at the same time as rises in commodity and stock prices in anticipation of a subsequent increase in economic 
growth. 
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relationship between commodity prices and the business cycle is time-varying.25 There exists a 
substantive and entirely separate literature that investigates the properties of certain time-series to 
predict future levels of industrial production several quarters ahead.26 Since these series are noisy 
and their individual forecasting power may vary over time, a set of composite leading indicators, 
combining several individual leading series in a weighted fashion, are also constructed. The most 
commonly used such composite leading indicator (CLI) is the World CLI produced by the 
OECD.27 
We rerun the two-step regression procedure, using all financial and macroeconomic 
indicators in Table VI discussed above alongside the monthly unexpected change in the OECD 
World CLI (UCLI) for the entire 1991-2012 sample period. The results for the lambda estimates 
are presented in Table VII. The risk premia for UCLI are not statistically significant even at the 
10% level. Of particular interest to the present study is whether the coefficients on the AVG and 
TS portfolios differ compared with the corresponding values reported in Table VI. There is 
clearly no reduction in the strength of the long, short and long-short risk premium based on TS. 
This suggests that the two commodity portfolios we propose (AVG and TS) are entirely separate 
sources of risk compared with that embodied in UCLI.  
< Insert Table VII around here > 
6. Conclusions 
This article studies the pricing of two hypothesized commodity risks in the cross-section of 
equity returns. The first commodity risk is modelled as exposure to a long-only equally-weighted 
                                                 
25 Specifically focusing on industrial metals, Jacobsen et al. (2013) suggest that during recessions, a rise in 
commodity prices is a positive signal of increasing subsequent economic activity, while the reverse is true during 
expansions when the level of activity is already high and further price rises are considered as signs of “overheating”. 
26 See, for example, Bandholz and Funke (2003), Banerjee and Maellino (2006). 
27The CLI series comprises: Dwellings started (number), Net new orders for durable goods (USD), Share prices: 
NYSE composite (2010=100), Consumer sentiment indicator (normal = 100), Weekly hours of work: manufacturing 
(hours), Purchasing managers index (% balance), Spread of interest rates (% p.a.). 
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portfolio of commodity futures (AVG); the second commodity risk is measured as sensitivity to a 
long-short term structure portfolio (TS) that captures phases of backwardation and contango in 
commodity futures markets. Our motivation for studying this question comes from the ambiguous 
impact of commodity risk on stock returns. While they could signal worsening cost bases and 
reductions in profitability, rising commodity prices could also indicate improving expected 
growth in the real economy and thus potentially higher firm profitability. The question of the sign 
and statistical significance of the AVG and TS risk premia in the cross-section of equity returns 
thus needs to be tested empirically. 
We present evidence that exposures to the TS of commodities command positive and 
statistically significant risk premia in the cross-section of the excess returns of the 25 global SBM 
equity portfolios of Fama and French (1998). The signs obtained on the risk premia indicate that 
investors perceive periods of expected rising commodity prices as bad news; they then demand 
compensation for exposure to commodity price risk. Vice versa, periods of expected falling 
commodity prices are perceived as good news; investors are then happy to earn lower expected 
returns on equities that are sensitive to commodity price risks. Further evidence suggests that the 
conclusions are not an artifact of crude oil. They are also robust to the analysis of sub-samples 
and to several specifications of the asset pricing model employed such as those developed by 
Carhart (1997) or Chen et al. (1986).  
While our research presents a clear demonstration that commodity risks are priced in global 
financial markets, an obvious question for future research is why this is the case. Commodity and 
stock prices are linked, both directly and indirectly, as a result of the important use of 
commodities in production processes. The direct effect of commodity price rises occurs when 
changes in the cost of commodities affect a firm’s profitability where commodities are a 
significant proportion of their overall costs. The indirect impact takes place through their effects 
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on the inflation rate via the costs of goods, and the resulting fall in consumers’ purchasing power 
will then adversely affect their demand for end products and services. Eventually, this feeds 
through to firms’ cash-flows (see Jones and Kaul, 1996). It would be of interest to investigate 
which of these two channels is the more prominent in driving commodity risk premia.  
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Figure 1: 45 Degree Line for Commodity versus non-Commodity Models 
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Figure 2: Surface Plot for Rolling Betas on the Term Structure Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Surface Plot for t-ratios of Rolling Betas on the Term Structure Portfolio 
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Table I. Summary statistics for the excess returns of long backwardated, short contangoed and long-short commodity portfolios 
 
 
 
The table shows summary statistics for the monthly returns of long, short and long-short commodity portfolios. The three sets of columns 
headed ‘Long backwardation’, ‘Short contango’, and ‘Long-short portfolio’ refer to the three different approaches to forming the commodity 
portfolios by taking the 25% of most backwardated or/and most contangoed commodities. The sorting criterion in Panel A (Panel B) is the 
roll-yields (hedging pressure of hedgers and speculators) averaged over the previous R months with R= 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. EW (R=1, 3, 6, 
12) stands for the excess returns of a portfolio that equally weights and monthly rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, 
respectively) portfolios with the four different horizons. Mean and SD stand for annualized mean excess returns and annualized standard 
deviation of excess returns, respectively; Sharpe equals Mean/SD, Lo’s (2002) t-statistics are in parentheses. Estimation period: January 1991-
December 2012.  
 
  
SD Sharpe
t -
Sharpe
t
- SD Sharpe
t -
Sharpe SD Sharpe
t -
Sharpe
t
-
Panel A: Sorting based on the slope of the term structure
R=1 0.0184 (0.44) 0.1946 0.0948 (0.44) -0.0670 (-1.89) 0.1665 -0.4023 (-1.88) 0.0427 (1.89) 0.1059 0.4031 (1.88)
R=3 0.0909 (2.48) 0.1717 0.5294 (2.47) -0.0812 (-2.45) 0.1554 -0.5227 (-2.44) 0.0861 (4.64) 0.0869 0.9903 (4.55)
R=6 0.0711 (1.98) 0.1682 0.4228 (1.98) -0.0704 (-2.15) 0.1534 -0.4589 (-2.14) 0.0708 (3.61) 0.0919 0.7697 (3.57)
R=12 0.0312 (0.83) 0.1758 0.1775 (0.83) -0.0456 (-1.38) 0.1554 -0.2932 (-1.37) 0.0384 (1.97) 0.0916 0.4192 (1.96)
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0529 (1.52) 0.1637 0.3232 (1.51) -0.0660 (-2.10) 0.1472 -0.4485 (-2.09) 0.0595 (3.42) 0.0817 0.7283 (3.38)
Panel B: Sorting based on the hedging pressure of hedgers and speculators
R=1 0.0369 (1.04) 0.1661 0.2223 (1.04) -0.0398 (-1.22) 0.1526 -0.2606 (-1.22) 0.0383 (2.18) 0.0823 0.4657 (2.17)
R=3 0.0134 (0.38) 0.1653 0.0812 (0.38) -0.0361 (-1.12) 0.1517 -0.2379 (-1.11) 0.0248 (1.47) 0.0789 0.3137 (1.47)
R=6 0.0298 (0.90) 0.1550 0.1921 (0.90) -0.0446 (-1.30) 0.1611 -0.2771 (-1.30) 0.0372 (2.05) 0.0850 0.4377 (2.04)
R=12 0.0607 (1.74) 0.1632 0.3717 (1.74) -0.0783 (-2.29) 0.1603 -0.4885 (-2.28) 0.0695 (3.96) 0.0823 0.8441 (3.90)
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0352 (1.07) 0.1548 0.2273 (1.07) -0.0497 (-1.58) 0.1479 -0.3359 (-1.57) 0.0424 (2.72) 0.0733 0.5790 (2.70)
Long-short portfolio
Mean Mean Mean
Short contangoLong backwardation
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Table II. Correlations between traditional and commodity risk factors 
 
 
 
The table presents correlations between the excess returns of equally-weighted (AVG), backwardated, contangoed and long-short commodity 
portfolios on the one hand and the excess returns of various traditional risk premia on the other hand. The AVG portfolio is an equally-weighted 
monthly-rebalanced portfolio that is long all 27 commodities. The backwardated, contangoed and long-short portfolios are formed by taking the 
25% most backwardated or/and most contangoed commodities based on roll-yields in Panel A (based on the positions of hedgers and speculators 
in Panel B) averaged over the previous R months. EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) stands for the excess returns of a portfolio that equally weights and monthly 
rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, respectively) portfolios with R= 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. ERM, SMB, HML, and UMD are 
global market, size, value, and momentum risk premia. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Estimation period: January 1991-December 2012. 
Panel A: Sorting based on the slope of the term structure (TS)
AVG 0.77 *** 0.76 *** 0.74 *** 0.78 *** 0.82 *** 0.75 *** 0.76 *** 0.74 *** 0.72 *** 0.79 *** 0.13 * 0.07 0.06 0.14 ** 0.12 *
ERM 0.46 *** 0.30 *** 0.33 *** 0.38 *** 0.41 *** 0.38 *** 0.35 *** 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 0.33 *** 0.37 *** 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.11 * 0.05
SMB 0.14 ** 0.21 *** 0.17 ** 0.14 ** 0.11 * 0.17 ** 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.19 *** 0.16 ** 0.08 0.11 * 0.15 **
HML -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 ** -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 * -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
UMD -0.04 0.09 * 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 ** -0.12 ** -0.17 ** -0.15 ** -0.15 ** 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.14 ** 0.11 * 0.18 ***
HP 0.64 *** 0.66 *** 0.65 *** 0.69 *** 0.74 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.68 *** 0.13 ** 0.11 * 0.15 ** 0.18 *** 0.19 ***
Panel B: Sorting based on the hedging pressure of hedgers and speculators (HP)
AVG 0.81 *** 0.81 *** 0.80 *** 0.82 *** 0.85 *** 0.74 *** 0.76 *** 0.76 *** 0.76 *** 0.80 *** 0.14 0.11 * 0.01 0.07 0.09
ERM 0.46 *** 0.42 *** 0.40 *** 0.42 *** 0.37 *** 0.42 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.39 *** 0.30 *** 0.38 *** 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.07
SMB 0.14 ** 0.13 ** 0.17 ** 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 *** 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.13 ** 0.13 ** 0.15 ** 0.13 **
HML -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 * -0.10 * -0.09
UMD -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06
TS 0.64 *** 0.66 *** 0.65 *** 0.69 *** 0.74 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.68 *** 0.13 ** 0.11 * 0.15 ** 0.18 *** 0.19 ***
R=1
EW (R=1, 
3, 6, 12)
R=1
Panel I: 
AVG      
Panel III: Short contangoPanel II: Long backwardation
R=1
Panel IV: Long-short portfolio
R=3 R=6 R=12R=12
EW (R=1, 
3, 6, 12)
EW (R=1, 
3, 6, 12)
R=3 R=6 R=12 R=3 R=6
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Table III. Cross-sectional pricing of commodity and traditional risks in global equity portfolios 
 
 
The table presents averages of the prices of risk λ estimated from second-stage cross-sectional regressions using 25 global SBM-sorted portfolios as 
base assets. λ0 is a constant. ERM, SMB, HML, UMD and AVG are the global market risk premium, the returns of the global size, value and momentum 
portfolios and the excess returns on the long-only equally-weighted portfolio of all 27 commodities. The three panels headed ‘Long backwardated 
portfolios’, ‘Short contangoed portfolios’, and ‘Long-short commodity portfolios’ refer to the three different approaches to forming commodity 
portfolios by taking the 25% of most backwardated or/and most contangoed commodities based on roll-yields (the positions of hedgers and speculators) 
averaged over the previous R months. λTS stands for the price of risk associated with the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, respectively) 
portfolios based on TS signals after the excess returns of the TS portfolios have been orthogonalized with respect to AVG and HP. λHP stands for the 
price of risk associated with the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, respectively) portfolios based on hedging pressure (HP) after the latter have 
been orthogonalized with respect to AVG and TS. EW (R= 1, 3, 6, 12) stands for the excess returns of a portfolio that equally weights and monthly 
rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short, respectively) portfolios with R= 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. Shanken-corrected t-statistics are in 
parentheses (.) and bootstrapped p-values in braces {.}. Estimation period: January 1991-December 2012.  
Panel A: Without AVG, TS and/or HP
Without AVG, TS and HP 0.0141 (4.30) {0.01} -0.0102 (-2.41) {0.09} 0.0003 (0.18) {0.47} 0.0038 (2.07) {0.17} 0.0010 (0.20) {0.43}
Without TS and HP 0.0129 (3.69) {0.02} -0.0089 (-2.00) {0.14} 0.0004 (0.27) {0.44} 0.0039 (2.07) {0.11} 0.0022 (0.44) {0.37} -0.0061 (-1.29) {0.23}
Panel B: Long backwardated portfolios
R=1 0.0114 (2.97) {0.03} -0.0077 (-1.65) {0.16} 0.0006 (0.34) {0.43} 0.0038 (1.99) {0.13} 0.0028 (0.53) {0.35} -0.0021 (-0.41) {0.38} 0.0139 (1.73) {0.13} -0.0011 (-0.21) {0.44}
R=3 0.0085 (2.28) {0.08} -0.0047 (-1.02) {0.27} 0.0006 (0.33) {0.42} 0.0040 (2.05) {0.09} 0.0040 (0.79) {0.30} -0.0012 (-0.24) {0.41} 0.0108 (2.00) {0.08} 0.0056 (1.10) {0.17}
R=6 0.0125 (3.33) {0.02} -0.0086 (-1.85) {0.14} 0.0005 (0.27) {0.44} 0.0040 (2.03) {0.12} 0.0028 (0.54) {0.34} -0.0054 (-1.07) {0.24} 0.0123 (1.72) {0.11} 0.0042 (0.76) {0.28}
R=12 0.0102 (2.36) {0.04} -0.0066 (-1.22) {0.21} 0.0005 (0.24) {0.44} 0.0041 (1.81) {0.11} -0.0022 (-0.35) {0.40} -0.0075 (-1.25) {0.16} 0.0275 (3.49) {0.00} 0.0101 (1.71) {0.09}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0099 (2.47) {0.06} -0.0061 (-1.24) {0.22} 0.0006 (0.30) {0.44} 0.0039 (1.89) {0.12} 0.0042 (0.75) {0.29} -0.0051 (-0.93) {0.25} 0.0175 (2.95) {0.01} 0.0019 (0.42) {0.36}
Panel C: Short contangoed portfolios
R=1 0.0149 (4.25) {0.00} -0.0110 (-2.45) {0.07} 0.0004 (0.22) {0.46} 0.0040 (2.12) {0.13} -0.0009 (-0.18) {0.44} -0.0068 (-1.41) {0.17} -0.0030 (-0.56) {0.37} -0.0023 (-0.46) {0.38}
R=3 0.0140 (3.87) {0.00} -0.0101 (-2.14) {0.10} 0.0004 (0.27) {0.44} 0.0040 (2.07) {0.11} 0.0012 (0.27) {0.42} -0.0104 (-2.00) {0.08} -0.0034 (-0.75) {0.31} -0.0009 (-0.20) {0.46}
R=6 0.0125 (3.59) {0.01} -0.0085 (-1.90) {0.11} 0.0005 (0.32) {0.41} 0.0040 (2.12) {0.08} 0.0058 (1.27) {0.19} -0.0078 (-1.50) {0.13} -0.0052 (-1.17) {0.21} 0.0031 (0.52) {0.39}
R=12 0.0142 (4.01) {0.00} -0.0102 (-2.23) {0.09} 0.0004 (0.21) {0.46} 0.0039 (2.00) {0.10} 0.0019 (0.43) {0.38} -0.0048 (-0.99) {0.26} -0.0084 (-1.56) {0.13} -0.0043 (-0.86) {0.26}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0147 (4.21) {0.00} -0.0107 (-2.35) {0.06} 0.0004 (0.24) {0.44} 0.0040 (2.12) {0.10} 0.0023 (0.53) {0.36} -0.0085 (-1.67) {0.11} -0.0042 (-1.08) {0.25} -0.0016 (-0.36) {0.40}
Panel D: Long-short commodity portfolios
R=1 0.0127 (3.45) {0.01} -0.0089 (-1.93) {0.13} 0.0005 (0.27) {0.45} 0.0039 (1.99) {0.13} -0.0003 (-0.06) {0.48} -0.0063 (-1.28) {0.21} 0.0097 (1.89) {0.12} -0.0026 (-0.62) {0.33}
R=3 0.0115 (3.10) {0.02} -0.0076 (-1.62) {0.16} 0.0004 (0.27) {0.44} 0.0041 (2.14) {0.08} 0.0037 (0.76) {0.29} -0.0077 (-1.50) {0.14} 0.0066 (1.67) {0.15} 0.0011 (0.31) {0.38}
R=6 0.0125 (3.28) {0.01} -0.0085 (-1.75) {0.12} 0.0005 (0.30) {0.42} 0.0040 (2.01) {0.09} 0.0057 (1.10) {0.21} -0.0086 (-1.53) {0.12} 0.0120 (2.23) {0.06} 0.0008 (0.15) {0.41}
R=12 0.0126 (3.23) {0.01} -0.0088 (-1.77) {0.12} 0.0004 (0.20) {0.46} 0.0040 (1.92) {0.11} 0.0014 (0.26) {0.42} -0.0066 (-1.22) {0.19} 0.0167 (3.20) {0.01} 0.0033 (0.80) {0.30}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0127 (3.34) {0.01} -0.0088 (-1.83) {0.11} 0.0005 (0.27) {0.43} 0.0040 (1.99) {0.10} 0.0024 (0.47) {0.37} -0.0084 (-1.55) {0.13} 0.0111 (2.73) {0.03} -0.0005 (-0.15) {0.47}
λHPλ0 λERM λSMB λHML λTSλUMD λAVG
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Table IV. Full-sample beta estimates of the 25 global SBM portfolios relative to AVG and TS 
 
 
The table presents the parameter estimates and associated Newey-West (1987) t-statistics of the 25 global SBM portfolios relative to 
the excess returns of the long-only AVG portfolio (Panel A) and the excess returns of the long-short TS– see Panel D: EW (R=1, 3, 
6, 12) in Table III for further details (Panel B). In order to preserve space, all the other risk factors are not presented although they 
are included in the models. Bold font denotes results that are statistically significant at the 10% level or better.    
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High Low-High Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.0134 0.0951 0.0519 0.0472 0.0364 -0.0230 0.52 3.85 2.15 2.54 1.79
2 -0.0727 -0.0124 -0.0203 0.0109 -0.0372 -0.0355 -3.64 -0.83 -1.28 0.84 -2.40
3 -0.0504 0.0142 0.0357 0.0402 0.0122 -0.0626 -2.46 0.84 1.82 2.18 0.73
4 -0.0180 0.0447 0.0360 0.0805 0.0032 -0.0212 -0.83 1.63 2.22 4.05 0.17
Big -0.0036 -0.0136 0.0382 -0.0127 0.0005 -0.0041 -0.16 -0.78 2.33 -0.73 0.02
Small-Big 0.0170 0.1087 0.0137 0.0599 0.0359
Low 2 3 4 High Low-High Low 2 3 4 High
Small -0.0167 -0.0318 0.0091 0.0147 -0.0356 0.0189 -0.50 -1.15 0.33 0.67 -1.19
2 -0.0684 -0.0217 -0.0008 -0.0083 -0.0118 -0.0566 -2.70 -0.81 -0.03 -0.38 -0.58
3 0.0048 0.0466 0.0133 0.0146 -0.0401 0.0449 0.13 1.70 0.54 0.56 -1.40
4 0.1045 -0.0065 0.0381 0.0127 -0.0020 0.1065 3.15 -0.24 1.85 0.45 -0.08
Big -0.0183 -0.0206 -0.0089 -0.0354 0.0232 -0.0415 -0.74 -1.09 -0.48 -1.37 0.79
Small-Big 0.0016 -0.0112 0.0180 0.0501 -0.0589
BM BM
Size
Panel B: Long-short TS portfolio
Betas Newey-West t -statistics
BM
Size
BM
Panel A: AVG portfolio
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Table V. The impact of crude oil 
 
 
 
The table tests the robustness of the results presented in Table III to the exclusion of crude oil futures. The table presents averages of the prices of risk λ 
estimated from second-stage cross-sectional regressions using 25 global SBM portfolios as base assets. λ0 is a constant. ERM, SMB, HML and UMD are 
the global market risk premium, the returns of the global size, value and momentum portfolios; AVG-no crude, TS-No crude and HP-No crude are the 
excess returns of the long-only equally-weighted portfolio of all 27 commodities, of the long-short TS and HP portfolios after they have been purged from 
the effect of crude oil. The three panels headed ‘Long backwardated portfolios’, ‘Short contangoed portfolios’, and ‘Long-short commodity portfolios’ 
refer to the three different approaches to forming commodity portfolios by taking the 25% of most backwardated or/and most contangoed commodities 
based on roll-yields (the positions of hedgers and speculators) averaged over the previous R months. EW (R= 1, 3, 6, 12) stands for the excess returns of a 
portfolio that equally weights and monthly rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short) portfolios based on TS or HP. Shanken-corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses (.) and bootstrapped p-values are in braces {.}. Estimation period: January 1991-December 2012. 
Panel A: Long backwardated portfolios
R=1 0.0132 (3.11) {0.01} -0.0093 (-1.86) {0.07} 0.0005 (0.25) {0.42} 0.0041 (1.94) {0.09} 0.0050 (0.88) {0.24} 0.0042 (0.75) {0.28} 0.0234 (2.13) {0.05} -0.0101 (-1.36) {0.12}
R=3 0.0093 (2.49) {0.05} -0.0055 (-1.19) {0.21} 0.0004 (0.22) {0.42} 0.0041 (2.11) {0.07} 0.0045 (0.89) {0.25} 0.0055 (1.23) {0.19} 0.0075 (1.34) {0.16} 0.0040 (0.79) {0.28}
R=6 0.0134 (3.52) {0.01} -0.0095 (-2.02) {0.09} 0.0003 (0.16) {0.47} 0.0040 (2.03) {0.10} 0.0039 (0.77) {0.31} 0.0007 (0.17) {0.47} 0.0126 (1.82) {0.08} 0.0002 (0.03) {0.50}
R=12 0.0106 (2.26) {0.03} -0.0068 (-1.20) {0.15} 0.0003 (0.13) {0.45} 0.0042 (1.75) {0.08} -0.0009 (-0.14) {0.45} 0.0006 (0.12) {0.46} 0.0341 (3.82) {0.00} 0.0044 (0.73) {0.29}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0099 (2.30) {0.05} -0.0061 (-1.17) {0.18} 0.0004 (0.21) {0.43} 0.0041 (1.87) {0.08} 0.0050 (0.87) {0.24} 0.0029 (0.57) {0.35} 0.0203 (3.08) {0.01} -0.0021 (-0.45) {0.36}
Panel B: Short contangoed portfolios
R=1 0.0150 (4.30) {0.00} -0.0110 (-2.49) {0.05} 0.0003 (0.15) {0.45} 0.0040 (2.10) {0.11} 0.0005 (0.11) {0.49} -0.0004 (-0.10) {0.47} -0.0085 (-1.53) {0.13} 0.0020 (0.39) {0.39}
R=3 0.0127 (3.56) {0.01} -0.0088 (-1.93) {0.09} 0.0004 (0.22) {0.43} 0.0040 (2.05) {0.08} 0.0020 (0.44) {0.38} -0.0031 (-0.72) {0.29} -0.0072 (-1.65) {0.12} 0.0048 (1.01) {0.22}
R=6 0.0124 (3.42) {0.01} -0.0085 (-1.90) {0.09} 0.0004 (0.25) {0.42} 0.0041 (2.14) {0.07} 0.0048 (1.04) {0.24} 0.0010 (0.24) {0.44} -0.0046 (-1.01) {0.21} 0.0070 (1.18) {0.18}
R=12 0.0135 (3.88) {0.00} -0.0095 (-2.13) {0.07} 0.0002 (0.11) {0.46} 0.0039 (2.03) {0.09} 0.0017 (0.40) {0.40} 0.0006 (0.15) {0.46} -0.0093 (-1.73) {0.09} 0.0001 (0.02) {0.49}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0143 (4.07) {0.00} -0.0103 (-2.30) {0.05} 0.0003 (0.18) {0.43} 0.0040 (2.08) {0.08} 0.0021 (0.47) {0.37} -0.0007 (-0.16) {0.44} -0.0070 (-1.78) {0.10} 0.0040 (0.89) {0.24}
Panel C: Long-short commodity portfolios
R=1 0.0134 (3.40) {0.01} -0.0095 (-1.97) {0.08} 0.0004 (0.19) {0.44} 0.0040 (1.93) {0.11} 0.0008 (0.14) {0.48} -0.0005 (-0.10) {0.47} 0.0155 (2.56) {0.03} -0.0085 (-1.77) {0.09}
R=3 0.0105 (2.86) {0.03} -0.0067 (-1.45) {0.16} 0.0003 (0.19) {0.43} 0.0042 (2.18) {0.07} 0.0031 (0.66) {0.33} 0.0005 (0.11) {0.48} 0.0068 (1.77) {0.11} -0.0011 (-0.33) {0.40}
R=6 0.0128 (3.31) {0.01} -0.0089 (-1.85) {0.09} 0.0004 (0.20) {0.43} 0.0041 (2.05) {0.07} 0.0051 (1.02) {0.24} 0.0004 (0.10) {0.50} 0.0111 (2.23) {0.04} -0.0014 (-0.29) {0.42}
R=12 0.0107 (2.54) {0.02} -0.0069 (-1.31) {0.15} 0.0002 (0.08) {0.46} 0.0041 (1.85) {0.08} 0.0014 (0.26) {0.42} 0.0003 (0.07) {0.48} 0.0210 (3.68) {0.00} -0.0022 (-0.49) {0.34}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0121 (3.01) {0.01} -0.0083 (-1.64) {0.11} 0.0003 (0.19) {0.43} 0.0041 (1.95) {0.07} 0.0021 (0.39) {0.39} 0.0003 (0.06) {0.49} 0.0135 (3.06) {0.01} -0.0041 (-1.11) {0.20}
λAVG-No crude λTS-No crude λHP-No crudeλ0 λERM λSMB λHML λUMD
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Table VI. Cross-sectional pricing of commodity, financial and macroeconomic risks 
 
 
 
The table presents averages of the prices of risk λ estimated from second-stage cross-sectional regressions using 25 global SBM portfolios as base assets. 
λ0 is a constant. IP, DEI, UI, UDS and UTS are the monthly growth in industrial production, changes in expected inflation, unexpected inflation, shocks 
to default and term spreads, respectively. AVG, TS and HP are the excess returns of the long-only equally-weighted portfolio of all 27 commodities, of 
the long-short TS and HP portfolios. The three panels headed ‘Long backwardated portfolios’, ‘Short contangoed portfolios’, and ‘Long-short 
commodity portfolios’ refer to the three different approaches to forming commodity portfolios by taking the 25% of most backwardated or/and most 
contangoed commodities based on roll-yields (the positions of hedgers and speculators) averaged over the previous R months. EW (R= 1, 3, 6, 12) stands 
for the excess returns of a portfolio that equally weights and monthly rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short) portfolios based on TS or 
HP. Shanken-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses (.) and bootstrapped p-values are in braces {.}. Estimation period: January 1991-December 2012. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Long backwardated portfolios
R=1 0.0094 (2.50) {0.02} -0.0127 (-0.21) {0.46} 0.0190 (1.85) {0.07} 0.0072 (0.44) {0.42} 0.1110 (0.74) {0.27} -0.0314 (-0.13) {0.49} 0.0020 (0.39) {0.40} 0.0171 (1.91) {0.05} -0.0047 (-0.59) {0.35}
R=3 0.0054 (1.43) {0.12} -0.0402 (-0.69) {0.30} 0.0270 (2.67) {0.02} 0.0058 (0.38) {0.41} 0.1475 (0.97) {0.22} 0.0021 (0.01) {0.47} -0.0013 (-0.24) {0.42} 0.0094 (1.38) {0.15} -0.0012 (-0.20) {0.48}
R=6 0.0067 (1.61) {0.08} -0.0035 (-0.05) {0.48} 0.0300 (2.49) {0.02} 0.0082 (0.52) {0.34} 0.1515 (0.95) {0.20} 0.0067 (0.03) {0.47} -0.0011 (-0.20) {0.44} 0.0083 (1.11) {0.19} 0.0081 (1.23) {0.16}
R=12 0.0086 (2.10) {0.02} -0.0279 (-0.46) {0.35} 0.0153 (1.49) {0.11} 0.0029 (0.18) {0.47} 0.1984 (1.19) {0.15} 0.0701 (0.28) {0.39} -0.0010 (-0.17) {0.44} 0.0092 (1.26) {0.13} 0.0195 (2.43) {0.01}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0051 (1.27) {0.13} -0.0290 (-0.46) {0.37} 0.0244 (2.33) {0.03} 0.0075 (0.47) {0.37} 0.1430 (0.87) {0.23} -0.0683 (-0.28) {0.43} -0.0016 (-0.29) {0.40} 0.0157 (2.63) {0.01} 0.0012 (0.21) {0.39}
Panel B: Short contangoed portfolios
R=1 0.0096 (2.82) {0.02} 0.0086 (0.15) {0.43} 0.0206 (2.15) {0.06} 0.0059 (0.40) {0.39} 0.1351 (0.96) {0.27} 0.0917 (0.44) {0.38} 0.0011 (0.21) {0.45} -0.0028 (-0.54) {0.35} -0.0006 (-0.10) {0.45}
R=3 0.0118 (3.52) {0.00} -0.0067 (-0.11) {0.48} 0.0160 (1.79) {0.09} 0.0062 (0.43) {0.41} 0.1967 (1.28) {0.17} 0.0996 (0.43) {0.39} -0.0100 (-1.66) {0.09} -0.0084 (-1.56) {0.09} -0.0068 (-1.01) {0.22}
R=6 0.0100 (2.99) {0.01} -0.0394 (-0.72) {0.29} 0.0146 (1.55) {0.12} 0.0010 (0.07) {0.49} 0.1444 (0.95) {0.27} 0.2365 (0.99) {0.24} -0.0011 (-0.21) {0.46} -0.0093 (-1.84) {0.07} -0.0021 (-0.25) {0.43}
R=12 0.0076 (1.99) {0.05} -0.0022 (-0.04) {0.48} 0.0232 (2.43) {0.02} 0.0088 (0.54) {0.36} 0.1380 (0.94) {0.23} -0.0020 (-0.01) {0.47} -0.0007 (-0.14) {0.48} -0.0149 (-2.15) {0.04} 0.0005 (0.09) {0.50}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0099 (2.95) {0.01} -0.0075 (-0.13) {0.48} 0.0184 (1.99) {0.08} 0.0041 (0.27) {0.45} 0.1165 (0.80) {0.29} 0.1017 (0.45) {0.36} -0.0037 (-0.65) {0.32} -0.0095 (-2.28) {0.03} -0.0040 (-0.69) {0.31}
Panel C: Long-short commodity portfolios
R=1 0.0082 (2.22) {0.03} 0.0137 (0.23) {0.39} 0.0200 (2.07) {0.05} 0.0062 (0.42) {0.40} 0.0822 (0.56) {0.34} -0.0270 (-0.12) {0.47} 0.0012 (0.22) {0.44} 0.0111 (2.26) {0.05} -0.0057 (-1.12) {0.22}
R=3 0.0079 (2.19) {0.03} -0.0441 (-0.74) {0.30} 0.0235 (2.41) {0.03} 0.0062 (0.42) {0.41} 0.1734 (1.11) {0.20} 0.0127 (0.06) {0.48} -0.0061 (-1.07) {0.21} 0.0090 (1.94) {0.06} 0.0015 (0.30) {0.37}
R=6 0.0097 (2.54) {0.02} -0.0227 (-0.36) {0.40} 0.0217 (2.01) {0.05} -0.0011 (-0.07) {0.47} 0.1373 (0.87) {0.25} 0.0787 (0.32) {0.38} -0.0028 (-0.47) {0.35} 0.0145 (2.57) {0.01} 0.0049 (0.74) {0.26}
R=12 0.0079 (1.99) {0.04} -0.0111 (-0.18) {0.48} 0.0185 (1.93) {0.06} 0.0026 (0.16) {0.48} 0.1191 (0.77) {0.28} -0.0801 (-0.34) {0.41} -0.0032 (-0.58) {0.33} 0.0076 (1.38) {0.18} 0.0100 (1.93) {0.09}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0079 (2.10) {0.04} -0.0080 (-0.13) {0.50} 0.0213 (2.23) {0.04} 0.0032 (0.22) {0.46} 0.1068 (0.68) {0.30} -0.0318 (-0.13) {0.48} -0.0030 (-0.52) {0.34} 0.0120 (2.93) {0.01} 0.0010 (0.21) {0.40}
λ0 λIP λDEI λUI λUDS λUTS λAVG λHPλTS
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Table VII. Cross-sectional pricing of commodity, financial, macroeconomic and business cycle risks 
 
 
 
The table presents averages of the prices of risk λ estimated from second-stage cross-sectional regressions using 25 global SBM portfolios as base assets. 
λ0 is a constant. IP, DEI, UI, UDS, UTS and UCLI are the monthly growth in industrial production, changes in expected inflation, unexpected inflation, , 
shocks to default and term spreads and the unexpected changes in the OECD World composite leading indicator, respectively. AVG, TS and HP are the 
excess returns of the long-only equally-weighted portfolio of all 27 commodities, of the long-short TS and HP portfolios. The three panels headed ‘Long 
backwardated portfolios’, ‘Short contangoed portfolios’, and ‘Long-short commodity portfolios’ refer to the three different approaches to forming 
commodity portfolios by taking the 25% of most backwardated or/and most contangoed commodities based on roll-yields (the positions of hedgers and 
speculators) averaged over the previous R months. EW (R= 1, 3, 6, 12) stands for the excess returns of a portfolio that equally weights and monthly 
rebalances the backwardated (contangoed and long-short) portfolios based on TS or HP. Shanken-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses (.) and 
bootstrapped p-values are in braces {.}. Estimation period: January 1991-December 2012. 
 
Panel A: Long backwardated portfolios
R=1 0.0081 (2.15) {0.04} 0.0416 (0.68) {0.32} 0.0172 (1.65) {0.09} 0.0137 (0.86) {0.27} 0.1346 (0.89) {0.23} 0.1785 (0.76) {0.28} 0.0097 (0.17) {0.45} 0.0021 (0.38) {0.37} 0.0148 (1.72) {0.09} 0.0022 (0.29) {0.40}
R=3 0.0059 (1.66) {0.10} 0.0134 (0.23) {0.46} 0.0189 (1.92) {0.08} 0.0070 (0.48) {0.36} 0.1221 (0.88) {0.23} 0.3692 (1.62) {0.10} -0.0374 (-0.70) {0.29} 0.0048 (0.83) {0.27} 0.0030 (0.43) {0.36} 0.0033 (0.56) {0.30}
R=6 0.0087 (2.22) {0.04} 0.0417 (0.60) {0.34} 0.0203 (1.70) {0.09} 0.0064 (0.41) {0.39} 0.1375 (0.88) {0.23} 0.2245 (0.90) {0.25} -0.0441 (-0.72) {0.29} 0.0036 (0.61) {0.31} 0.0076 (0.96) {0.23} 0.0118 (1.71) {0.07}
R=12 0.0091 (2.33) {0.02} -0.0044 (-0.07) {0.45} 0.0141 (1.34) {0.13} 0.0054 (0.35) {0.38} 0.1616 (1.05) {0.17} 0.1850 (0.72) {0.27} -0.0013 (-0.02) {0.49} 0.0007 (0.11) {0.45} 0.0101 (1.32) {0.13} 0.0190 (2.53) {0.02}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0059 (1.55) {0.11} 0.0171 (0.27) {0.43} 0.0178 (1.66) {0.10} 0.0069 (0.45) {0.38} 0.1010 (0.65) {0.29} 0.2056 (0.83) {0.28} -0.0436 (-0.75) {0.27} 0.0022 (0.35) {0.37} 0.0146 (2.34) {0.03} 0.0054 (0.96) {0.22}
Panel B: Short contangoed portfolios
R=1 0.0115 (3.45) {0.01} 0.0354 (0.61) {0.36} 0.0166 (1.65) {0.13} 0.0081 (0.54) {0.37} 0.1654 (1.20) {0.17} 0.1960 (0.90) {0.26} -0.0108 (-0.19) {0.44} 0.0009 (0.17) {0.43} -0.0039 (-0.81) {0.30} -0.0004 (-0.07) {0.48}
R=3 0.0124 (3.77) {0.00} 0.0128 (0.22) {0.48} 0.0148 (1.65) {0.13} 0.0052 (0.35) {0.43} 0.1889 (1.28) {0.15} 0.1777 (0.76) {0.27} -0.0434 (-0.76) {0.29} -0.0074 (-1.13) {0.22} -0.0079 (-1.41) {0.14} -0.0073 (-1.13) {0.21}
R=6 0.0107 (3.10) {0.00} -0.0191 (-0.34) {0.36} 0.0129 (1.35) {0.17} 0.0020 (0.13) {0.49} 0.1614 (1.08) {0.21} 0.3408 (1.38) {0.17} -0.0177 (-0.31) {0.39} 0.0011 (0.18) {0.45} -0.0107 (-1.89) {0.07} 0.0019 (0.23) {0.45}
R=12 0.0093 (2.58) {0.01} 0.0277 (0.46) {0.39} 0.0190 (1.99) {0.06} 0.0097 (0.60) {0.35} 0.1368 (0.98) {0.21} 0.2345 (1.02) {0.21} -0.0094 (-0.18) {0.43} 0.0024 (0.40) {0.36} -0.0133 (-1.85) {0.09} 0.0014 (0.23) {0.43}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0110 (3.32) {0.01} 0.0253 (0.45) {0.39} 0.0149 (1.58) {0.14} 0.0047 (0.30) {0.44} 0.1095 (0.78) {0.28} 0.2658 (1.16) {0.21} -0.0187 (-0.33) {0.38} 0.0001 (0.01) {0.48} -0.0093 (-2.13) {0.05} -0.0011 (-0.19) {0.44}
Panel C: Long-short commodity portfolios
R=1 0.0091 (2.55) {0.01} 0.0530 (0.87) {0.26} 0.0157 (1.56) {0.11} 0.0094 (0.65) {0.32} 0.0972 (0.66) {0.30} 0.0874 (0.39) {0.38} 0.0091 (0.15) {0.46} 0.0006 (0.10) {0.45} 0.0123 (2.34) {0.04} -0.0034 (-0.66) {0.30}
R=3 0.0084 (2.52) {0.03} -0.0045 (-0.08) {0.44} 0.0174 (1.82) {0.10} 0.0066 (0.46) {0.39} 0.1161 (0.84) {0.26} 0.2460 (1.07) {0.22} -0.0503 (-0.92) {0.26} -0.0002 (-0.03) {0.49} 0.0060 (1.21) {0.19} 0.0034 (0.68) {0.30}
R=6 0.0112 (3.06) {0.00} 0.0096 (0.15) {0.48} 0.0166 (1.50) {0.11} -0.0015 (-0.09) {0.45} 0.0807 (0.53) {0.33} 0.2760 (1.07) {0.22} -0.0396 (-0.64) {0.30} 0.0029 (0.43) {0.35} 0.0164 (2.65) {0.01} 0.0030 (0.44) {0.35}
R=12 0.0085 (2.31) {0.04} 0.0352 (0.59) {0.36} 0.0138 (1.41) {0.14} 0.0043 (0.28) {0.43} 0.0632 (0.45) {0.34} 0.1051 (0.44) {0.37} -0.0060 (-0.11) {0.46} 0.0015 (0.26) {0.41} 0.0099 (1.71) {0.14} 0.0085 (1.66) {0.14}
EW (R=1, 3, 6, 12) 0.0089 (2.47) {0.02} 0.0327 (0.54) {0.36} 0.0143 (1.45) {0.14} 0.0000 (0.00) {0.47} 0.0536 (0.36) {0.37} 0.1272 (0.51) {0.37} -0.0180 (-0.30) {0.39} 0.0002 (0.03) {0.47} 0.0136 (2.86) {0.01} 0.0005 (0.11) {0.47}
λ0 λIP λDEI λUI λUDS λUTS λUCLI λAVG λHPλTS
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Appendix: Details of the Bootstrap Procedure we employ 
 
1. For month t+k, we estimate the model as in equation (2) above and we save {?̂?0,𝑡+𝑘, ?̂?𝑡+𝑘} and 
?̂?𝑃,𝑡+𝑘 with P = 1,2,…, 25. 
2. Then, we generate b = 1,…,1000 pseudo-series by imposing the {𝜆0,𝑡+𝑘, 𝜆𝑡+𝑘} = 0: 
     𝑅𝑃,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏 = ?̂?𝑃,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏      (3) 
3. We estimate the Fama-MacBeth model for all those pseudo-series: 
𝑅𝑃,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏 = 𝜆0,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏 + 𝜆𝑡+𝑘
𝑏 𝛽𝑃 + 𝜗𝑃,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏     (4) 
Now we have ?̂?𝑡+𝑘
𝑏  (and ?̂?0,𝑡+𝑘
𝑏 ) for b = 1,…,1000 and for months 𝑡 + 𝑘,…,T  or a total of  𝑏 ∙ [𝑇 −
(𝑡 + 𝑘 − 1)] simulated lambdas per risk factor. We use the same bootstrap in the whole process and 
obtain the t-stat of the ?̅?𝐹
𝑏 = ∑
?̂?𝑖
𝑏
𝑇−(𝑡+𝑘−1)
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡+𝑘  for b = 1,…,1000, for risk factor 𝐹 whose distribution 
will be compared with the t-stat of the average lambda of the original two-stage Fama-MacBeth (i.e., 
?̅?𝐹 = ∑
?̂?𝑖
𝑇−(𝑡+𝑘−1)
𝑇
𝑖=𝑡+𝑘 ).  
 
